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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Death As Metaphor 
 
Lawrence Kimmel 
 
 
Oh when I was young and easy under the apple 
boughs ... Time held me green and dying, though I 
sang in my chains like the sea. 
◼ D. Thomas 
 
Think. I think we are in rats’ alley, where the dead 
men lost their bones. 
◼ T.S. Eliot 
 
                                              I 
 
   What remains to be said about the question and problem of 
death that has not been repeated a thousand times in the 
history of human thought and culture?  Philosophers in the 
Western tradition have seemingly argued every nuance of the 
name, nature, causes, and consequences of death since Plato 
first took up the death of Socrates as the funding occasion of 
his philosophical life and thinking.  Epicurean and Stoic 
philosophers subsequently framed the basic arguments that 
are still with us, directed to three basic questions concerning 
death: What is it? Is it good or bad? Should we fear it?   
 
   To the first question, arguments differ with respect to 
whether death is referenced as a state, a process, or an 
event—which is to say that the concept itself is ambiguous, 
so any discursive analysis must first settle the question of 
reference.  But it may be philosophically important to raise 
an additional and prior question about the meaning, hence 
nature of death just here: since the meaning of death is not 
limited to the domain of reference, inquiry into its nature and 
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meaning remains open to the full range of its contextual use 
in the shared language and life of human beings.   
 
   We are inclined to preference the referentially obvious: 
death does occur, and we are likely to experience anxiety 
when our own lives are threatened with the prospect of 
becoming the subject of its reference. There is an obvious 
and objective reference to the state of death as well—the 
dead in the morgue, soldiers brought home in the body bags 
of war—and, ceteris paribus, we are thankful not to be 
among them.  However, it is a case in point to note the 
contextual extension of referential meaning of death and 
dead, for example, in the Irish ballad, “The minstrel boy to 
the war is gone/ in the ranks of death you’ll find him…” 
(Moore,1859);or again, in the now familiar death-row 
declaration that accompanies the short walk to execution, 
“Dead Man Walking!”   Objective reference in each case is 
to the dead still living.  One might respond that they are not 
literally dead; but surely they are not figuratively dead either.  
In brief, the sense of reference requires elaboration. 
 
   Death as process is also a common reference in critical 
discussion, although as process it is better referenced as 
dying; death itself then references the termination of the 
process (this is the same grammatical point as saying that 
running is a process, winning is not).  But in any event the 
process is neither simple, nor easy.  Arguing in the Phaedo 
that philosophy is learning how to die, Socrates 
acknowledged this as the same task as learning how to live: 
the learning process is critical; it takes time, effort, and 
thought—it is the undertaking of a lifetime.  The process of 
living and dying and their relational meaning is intimately 
connected.  It is equally true to say either that you are now in 
the process of living, and/or in the process of dying (that, 
from the moment you are born you are dying, and that until 
the moment of death you are living).  It makes a considerable 
difference, of course, which description fits your disposition 
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(as in “half empty/half full”).  Confronted with a diagnosis of 
“terminal illness” one may choose the description and 
comportment “I am dying”; but it is equally a fact and 
arguably preferable to choose the alternative expression “I 
am living.”  The larger point within all of these seemingly 
obvious and preferred referential uses is that the concept of 
death remains ambiguous.  
  
   Answers to the second and third questions common to 
critical discussions of death cited above (Is it good or bad? Is 
it something we should fear or not?) clearly depend on how 
we come to understand the nature and meaning of death.  
The procedural point is that the meaning of both life and 
death is ambiguous.  And if we conceive meaning to be more 
critically extensive than that of objective reference, a better 
way of addressing the issue of the nature and meaning of 
death may be to acknowledge that an understanding of life 
and death requires or invites the use of metaphor. This, in 
any event, is the direction our discussion will take in the 
remarks that follow. 
 
   It is obvious, of course, that death can be used as a 
metaphor in the description of other things. “Sudden death 
overtime” is a familiar mundane sports expression that adds 
little to further our understanding of death as a terminus.  But 
other metaphorical uses are more reflective of the range of 
consciousness concerning life and death. Death at an Early 
Age for example, is a book written about the educational life 
and destiny of the inner-city ghetto child. Think of other 
familiar titles that disclose domain and dimensions of 
meaning: Death in Venice about spiritual decay; The Naked 
and the Dead,  about the visceral commonplaces of war.  But 
more generally, the meaning of both death and life are 
themselves embodied in metaphors.  We might say of death, 
what Wittgenstein remarked about pain: it is not something; 
but it is not nothing, either.  People do die; in fact, it is in the 
nature of all living things that they die, so death is not 
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nothing.  On the other hand, to say what death is, we must 
and do have recourse to metaphor in the narratives of life.  
Death is no more a thing than the mind or spirit is a thing, 
notwithstanding we change our minds and raise our spirits.  
So how are we to proceed? 
 
   A basic intuition is that, like any other concept, to 
understand the depth and dimensions of the meaning of 
death—its nature—we must surround the concept with its 
essential and relational expressions in contexts of use.  For 
example, we can, for specific purposes, referentially fix “the 
moment of death”—currently preferred is the diagnostic test 
of “brain dead.”  But this is only one functional notion of 
death, and it is a mistake to think this reference is somehow 
definitive or the root of all intelligible discussions of the 
nature of death. 
 
   It might be useful to distinguish two kinds of reality in this 
connection: fictive and factive reality.  The boundary 
between the two is not always definite or clear.  Death is a 
terminal condition of life: this is a fact (a truth of factive 
reality).  But cowards die many times before their death, 
while the valiant taste of death but once, which is at the very 
least a different kind of fact (what I rather here will call a 
truth of fictive reality).  There is an obvious philosophical 
hurdle—not, I think, dead end—that I will bypass in this 
essay.  For our purposes it is enough to concede that there 
are truths about life disclosed in fictive contexts—often cited 
as paradigms are the great soliloquies in the tragic drama of 
Shakespeare, not a few having to do with the boundaries of 
life and death, some of which we will reference as our 
inquiry proceeds.   In any event, both factive and fictive 
contexts figure significantly in our understanding of the 
human condition—the condition under which life is given to 
human beings, which includes natality and mortality.   
Together, they provide venues of expression for existential 
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truths of consciousness in the phenomenology of shared 
experience. 
 
                                 II  
 
   Man is a creature that knows he is going to die.  It is this 
fact of human existence that arguably accounts for the depth 
of human consciousness and the scope of human culture.  In 
any event, this situation is a compelling reason to appeal to 
literature as a philosophical resource for understanding death 
as defining feature of human life.   
 
   Plato set a limiting frame for the philosophical discussion 
of death in his account of the last days of Socrates, and there 
is a serious question whether we have progressed beyond 
Socrates’ counsel to his interlocutors at his execution that to 
consider death an evil to be feared is presumptive.  His 
argument is that genuine knowledge of death—of what it is 
to die—is not available to us in principle.  While Socrates 
does go on to claim that death properly understood is a good, 
the tenor of his argument is morally persuasive, intended to 
remind his friends to discover in themselves the virtue of 
courage that life requires.  His dying words to Crito—that he 
owes a cock to Aesclepius—is a parting metaphor of 
acknowledgement that death is part of the process of healing 
in and of a good life; that is, death is the making whole of a 
complete life well lived.  
 
   Apart from the metaphysics of this puzzle, it may be 
instructive to note a parallel lesson that physicians have 
discovered whose patients are all terminal: where curing is 
not possible, there is an alternative of healing.  One who 
cannot be cured of an illness may still be healed—that is, 
made whole in the acceptance of the conditions of her life, 
indeed of the conditions of life itself.  This has an effect of 
shifting the medical paradigm toward a broader conception 
of health, and of patient as person.  In terms of our present 
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interest, it also marks a different conception of the relation of 
living and dying.  It has been observed by those treating the 
terminally ill, that at a certain point, a patient shifts from 
deciding to live, to deciding to die.  The general point is that 
living and dying are of a piece, and that meaning plays a 
significant role even in the treatment of illness in the face of 
death. 
 
   Modern philosophical discussions tend not to draw on 
Plato’s metaphysical and moral discussion of death, but 
rather on Epicurean and Stoic texts that shift the focus to an 
aesthetics of pleasure, and to happiness in life.  On this latter 
view, death, conceived as annihilation or non-life, tends to 
be dismissively treated as irrelevant to positive discourse and 
concern.  The simple logic of this scheme is both clever and 
persuasive on its surface: As I am, death is not; as death is, I 
am not.  This mantra of dismissal is neat, and perhaps will 
suffice if we remain locked into a referential definition of 
death as a state or event.  But we are haunted in life by the 
spectre of death, and the dimensions of its meaning pervade 
too much of our lives to accept the simple reassurance of 
Epicurean reduction.  
 
   The domain of discourse of and about death is broad and 
varied in the life of culture, and this seems reason enough to 
extend philosophical inquiry and analysis to the full range of 
its metaphorical expression.  Of particular interest in the 
complex phenomena of consciousness is the ineffable, whose 
referential meaning is typically a boundary concept (life, 
death, absolute, infinite, God).   In this and related instances, 
indirect discourse and the ordinary and extraordinary 
contexts of literature become important resources of 
understanding.  Poetic expressions typically capture some 
image and aspect of common dread and wonder about 
death—images of final places, of sleep, of stillness, of 
darkness, of silence, of loss, of isolation, of release, of peace, 
in which death has currency as a summons, a judgment, a 
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journey.  The most well known of all literary references for 
every school child is probably Hamlet’s soliloquy, 
contemplating suicide, in which death is a consummation 
devoutly to be wished: 
 
…To die, to sleep; 
       To sleep: perchance to dream: ay, there's the rub; 
       For in that sleep of death what dreams may come 
       When we have shuffled off this mortal coil… 
But that the dread of something after death, 
       The undiscover'd country from whose bourn 
       No traveller returns, puzzles the will… 
◼ Shakespeare (Shakespeare, 1929, Act III) 
 
   Drawing back from the sharp edge of decision, Hamlet 
remarks on the general feeling that in the presence of death, 
“…conscience doth make cowards of us all” (Shakespeare, 
1929, Act III). In The Tempest, Shakespeare provides a 
different and larger picture, in Prospero’s metaphor of the 
world as a stage, and the end of the play of life is a striking 
of the set, where not a rack is left behind. The image here of 
death is romantically benign, in which our little lives are 
rounded with a sleep.  
 
   A different but common theme of realism is struck in 
Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, in the contemptuous 
announcement by a servant “Mistah Kurtz—he dead” 
(1971).  This scathing contempt reflects the crude and brutal 
facticity of living to dead.  The monstrous figure of Kurtz, 
who a short time before had been adored as a god, becomes a 
useless and offensive thing that is buried in a muddy hole the 
following day.  The heart of darkness metaphor in Conrad’s 
story has indefinite references—to the savage passion at the 
heart of civilized life as well as the primitive depth of the 
human soul. But at the heart of these images is a common 
idea in life and literature of death as a devouring darkness, 
the shroud that awaits the remains of a life, from Macbeth’s 
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weary resignation and acceptance of the waiting darkness 
“…Out, out brief candle…” (Shakespeare, 1963, Act V) to 
Thomas’ rage against the consuming darkness and the dying 
of that very light.  Whatever awaits, there is a deep and 
common resonance in the ominous summons of John 
Donne’s “For Whom the bell tolls”: Nunc Lento Sonitu 
Dicunt, Morieris - Now, this bell tolling softly for another, 
says to me: Thou must die (1972). 
 
   The many different images of death in literature bring into 
question again the complementary difference between sense 
and reference.  Consider the philosophical distinction 
between death, and its meaning—what it is / and what it 
means.  We want to say that a death in the family is real, 
whatever the meaning of the concept.  Death is final, 
whether welcome or terrifying, whether we understand it or 
not.  That raw fact of our mortality is something that 
happens with or without our acceptance.  But it is in the 
language of addressing even this bare fact that metaphor 
arises—that death comes to us, that we give in to it, accede 
finally to a recognition that whatever the wages of sin, death 
is the wage of life. Whether in the case of an athlete dying 
young, the clever lad slips away betimes, or is cut down in 
his prime, or another runs the good race of long life and slips 
quietly into everlasting rest, there is in every case dominion, 
disinvestment and devastation that requires the account of 
metaphor. 
 
   The reference of inquiry can be broadened by reviewing 
some of the familiar contexts and expressions in literature 
that inform our understanding of the enigmatic presence of 
death in life and human consciousness.  If we take the primal 
relation of natality and mortality as given:  then what?  
“Earth to earth, dust to dust…” (Revised English Bible, 
1989,3:19) this is the reality; but already in this expression 
the reality of death is brought in fuller meaning to 
consciousness.  The image of grains of sand draining away is 
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a familiar reference to time, to life, and to death.  The force 
of this image attests to the fact that life, in its rudimentary 
expression is time; death simply means that time runs out.  
The natural life of creatures other than Man is simply life 
and death in time—the whole of existence is framed in the 
exclusive metaphor of time.  Human life, in contrast, is a 
convergence of time and place such that the natural 
configuration of life and death is transformed.  World 
literature is full of memorable reference to the brief 
transience of place and to the furtive and insecure 
impermanence of hopeful moments in life.  It would be 
difficult to find better or more troubling expressions for the 
assimilation of life and death in terms of time and place than 
two classic literary indices of Hebraic and Hellenic cultures:
  
As for man, his days are as grass. As a flower of the 
field, so he flourishes. For the wind passes over it, 
and it is gone, and the place thereof shall know it no 
more.  
◼ The Bible (Old Testament, Psalm 103) 
 
As is the life of the leaves, so is that of men. The 
wind scatters the leaves to the ground: the vigorous 
forest puts forth others, and they grow in the spring 
season. Soon one generation of men comes and 
another ceases. 
◼ Homer (Iliad, Book VI) 
 
   Whether lament or simple acknowledgement, death brings 
a depth of recognition to the continuing gift of life.  That 
organic life feeds only on itself, that life comes from death is 
a staple imperative of both jungle and garden as well as a 
theme of literature.  But the human mind seems incapable of 
simple acceptance, and fashions instead a tragic culture.  
Rilke provides a modern expression of the same issue that 
confronted the Psalmist and the Epic poet:  
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Who’ll show a child just as he is? Who’ll set him in 
his constellation and put the measure of distance in 
his hand? Who’ll make the death of a child out of 
gray bread growing dark—or leave it there in his 
round mouth like the core of a sweet apple? 
Murderers are easily understood. But this: to hold 
death, the whole of death, so gently even before life’s 
begun, and not be mad—that’s beyond description. 
(1961) 
 
   The conception of the cycle of life and death invites a wide 
range of descriptive images.  Comparing the graceful 
expression of Tennyson’s distanced acceptance with that of 
Samuel Beckett’s acute discharge, one may wonder whether 
they are speaking of the same creature, the same sense of life 
and death.  In Tennyson’s expression, the familiar process is 
given depth and beauty: 
 
The woods decay; the woods decay and fall; the 
vapors weep their burden to the ground. Man comes 
and tills the field and lies beneath…and after many a 
summer dies the swan. 
(1941b, p. 61) 
 
   Beckett’s stark description of the same fact, “…they give 
birth astride a grave…” (1954, p.58) is brutal in its brevity; 
but if it fails in grace of expression, it loses no gravity of 
truth in its reference to the human condition. 
 
                                 III 
 
   The stoic idea that death is nothing—that while I am, it is 
not, and when it is, I am not—reflects a distinctive Western 
bias of individuation.  When autonomy loosens into self-
absorption, the reductive rule becomes: ‘If it be not so to 
me…what care I how it may be?’—whatever does not affect 
me is of no consequence.  What on this view is precious and 
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alone of absolute worth is my own life. Such a view in the 
end reduces life and death to the bare contingency of 
personal survival; the logic of that reduction can make of 
living an avoidance of death, so that survival becomes a 
desperate treading to keep one’s head above water.  The 
moral life and world of human beings embodies more than 
self-interest and the logistics of individual survival, however, 
and this makes more of death as well.   
 
   The basic and prior question in all this is why we continue 
to have such a strong philosophical interest in death.  The 
simple answer, I think, is because we are interested in 
understanding the gift of life.  As an existential issue, death 
prompts more than idle curiosity.  But if we concern 
ourselves only with the narrow fact of our own life and 
death, obsess with the contingency and imperative of mere 
survival, we will come to understand little about even our 
own individual lives, and nothing at all of the role that death 
plays in our collective lives.  More simply, philosophical 
inquiry reasonably addresses the pair or relatedness of the 
concepts life and death.  While we don’t necessarily 
understand one in terms of the other, it is doubtful we can 
understand either exclusive of the other. 
 
   In a debunking age of irony, wit is exercised to show that 
death, which traditionally has been a fascination and concern 
to peasant and poet alike, is a simple if not trivial fact; that 
while it may or may not be something to fret about, it is 
certainly not worth spilling philosophical ink.  In light of the 
declinations of Socratic ignorance and Stoic prudence, the 
question of death generally has been deferred to relatively 
idle speculation in clerical circles and spiritual cults.  
However, the issue and theme of death has remained a vital 
and imaginative impulse in the creative arts, and our critical 
understanding of the idea (word, concept) of death is 
indebted and indentured to the world of literature, and to the 
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full range and articulation of consciousness that is the field 
of literary expression. 
 
   Arguing against limiting philosophical analysis to 
referential meaning is intended to displace the bias of 
individuated consciousness under which the question of 
death is dismissed as moot. A broadened notion of 
experience and extended domain of consciousness opens the 
question of death to a greater field of imaginative inquiry. 
Recall, in this connection, Wittgenstein’s remark that what 
cannot be said (discursive matters of referential fact) may 
still be shown, through other forms of expression. This is not 
a particularly modern insight; the idea is central to Plato’s 
project and conception of the Dialogues, in his use of 
metaphor, myth, and allegory.  Even in the dialogue on death 
to which we have been referring, Plato does not let the 
matter rest with rejecting claims to knowledge, and he 
returns again to the question of death at the end of the 
Republic in the “Vision of Er.”  Rejecting Plato’s idealism 
does not diminish the critical insights of metaphor in the 
Dialogues. 
 
   Plato’s yoking of critical analysis to the literary resource of 
dramatic context, narrative story, and imaginative language 
remains a philosophical model for understanding the life of 
the mind.  An additional appeal to broaden the domain of 
philosophical analysis to fictive literature is derived from the 
nature of human beings as storytelling animals.  We live in 
and through the stories we tell and share.  Our individual and 
collective identities are framed within the stories we tell, 
whether narratives of history, scriptures of religion, or 
theories of science.  There is no specifically privileged 
meaning, just as there are no clear limits to the meaningful 
stories of life and death, in any particular field.  Whether or 
not great literature has only two themes—love and death—it 
is true enough to insist that death is an abiding passion in the 
life-world of human beings.  This fact, in turn, argues that 
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we should resist any impulse to dismiss the importance of 
metaphor on the presumption that it confuses the reality of 
factual annihilation with the romance of poetic conceit.  
  
   We come again and again to the central question of 
meaning in philosophical discourse.  From the first impulse 
of critical philosophy, conceptually and historically, the 
interest and task is to say what something is, to address the 
thing itself, to discover its nature or essence. In developing a 
method of analysis Plato contrasts merely giving an example 
with providing a definition of it.  Even granting the 
informative usefulness of an example, we have still to see 
what it is in the example that distinguishes the thing in 
question. In providing an exact definition we search for the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of the 
concept—and so the essence and nature of the thing itself: 
“An object is a triangle, if and only if….”   
 
   Not all concepts, however, can be given exact definitions, 
as Aristotle noted, and we must be satisfied with the 
precision allowed within a given form of discourse. It has 
seemed to some that the concept death can be given a 
definition--definite boundaries of reference, and so we can in 
this case have knowledge of the thing itself.  Common to 
every example of death is that it marks the end of life, which, 
in human life can be recorded by the flat reading of an 
electro-encephalogram—exact, as well as regrettable—but 
surely this doesn’t say much. 
 
   It may be helpful to our analysis to return to the closely 
related but separate questions of what something is, and what 
something means.  In the context of inquiry we want to know 
what something is, but we want also to understand what it 
means.  Clearly to know and to understand are connected, 
but I want to keep to the distinction for the moment.  The 
claim that death is nothing results from denying its 
possibility as an experience of consciousness; but this 
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introduces a basic philosophical puzzle that invariably links 
procedural and substantive questions. Every substantive 
claim of what something is or is not, carries with it the 
procedural questions: how do you know and how could you 
find out?  Our earlier reference to a parallel instance of the 
‘nothing’ of death, in Wittgenstein’s grammatical reminder 
that pain is nothing (no thing), does nothing to dispel the fact 
that pain is undeniably real: we can and do experience pain.  
There are likely medical descriptions and explanations of the 
physiology of pain—mechanics and dynamics of sense 
receptors, electrical impulse, nerve ends, brain stem 
connections—but the pain itself, we want to say, is what we 
feel, what we experience.  The paradigm of experience—the 
reality—is of a different order from that of explanation.   
 
   It is a slightly different task but a parallel procedure, for 
example, with the concept of mind.  The mind is not a thing, 
either, in the sense that the brain is a thing.  Reference is 
objectively clear in one case, not the other.  Even so, we do 
have minds and use them, we make up and change our 
minds; we judge that a person has a good mind, far superior 
to that of another person.  In this light, a good deal of 
philosophical effort is exercised in trying to say what the 
mind is—is it a function, or a process, or a structure…?—the 
current preference seems to fix its reference on analogy with 
computer software.  Once again, however, apart from 
theoretical constructs of mind, there is an ordinary and 
continuing experience that informs our understanding of the 
life of the mind. The mind—what it is and what it means—
requires an analysis of the various and variable uses of the 
concept in both theory and the language of ordinary 
experience. 
 
   Is it the same with death as with pain and mind?  Can we 
say what death is—the thing itself?  There are paradigm uses 
in each of these cases: If you want to know what pain 
is…here, let me hit your thumb with a hammer. If you wish 
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to know what mind is…think of a number between one and 
ten.  And if you want to know what death is…(?)  The 
unusual thing in this latter case is, as the stoics pointed out, 
whatever death is or is not, it is not open to the report of 
personal experience, and so the paradigm of meaning must 
be one of description or explanation—hence the usual focus 
on instruments that record the cessation of brain activity.  
Poets on the other hand, like the rest of us, continue to have a 
concern and wonderment about the phenomenology as well 
as the related phenomena of pain, and mind, and of the 
possible if unreportable experience of death.   
 
   Whatever form of analysis is used to account for the 
phenomenon and phenomena of death—whether the 
technical language of physiology, or the poetic language of 
tragic drama—the natural language of ordinary and shared 
life is the basic resource of every possible description, 
explanation and expression.  If we are interested in 
understanding the meaning of death—the He and the She of 
it all—then the only boundaries to philosophical inquiry are 
the linguistic limits of sense, which change with the ebb and 
flow of culture, no less than the progressive exactness of 
scientific discovery.  
 
   What we are trying to understand here, however, is more 
than an isolated phenomenon or experience.  Our cultural 
interest is engaged to understand the relation of life and 
death—life in death, death in life, the stuff that pervades 
consciousness and frames the boundaries of life and mind.  
Figurative language and fictive literature become critical in 
providing a contextual ground for inquiry into the drama of 
this relationship. 
 
                                  IV 
 
   Whether our informed discourse is about identity or 
ideology, mind or madness, there is a fund of human 
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understanding that draws on many different kinds of 
accounts in literature and the arts, no less than the biological, 
psychological and social sciences.  In addition to 
contributing to the ordinary discourse about our lives, 
literature gives expression to the ineffable, and so provides 
access to the sense and significance of the extraordinary and 
uncanny.  Illness, for example, may be clinically catalogued 
and medically diagnosed for treatment, but if we want to 
understand it, we must somehow get inside the experience 
itself.  There is a strong current of feeling about certain 
illnesses, for example cancer, that regards a diagnosis itself 
as a “death sentence.”  Susan Sontag, diagnosed with cancer, 
in her book Illness as Metaphor examines metaphors 
ostensibly used to support the will to resist cancer, in which 
she noted that they do both good and harm.  Metaphors of 
illness as punitive, as a curse, as an embarrassment, may well 
add to the devastation of the disease itself, and those 
burdened with the disease may be better advised that cancer 
is none of those things, that it is “simply, a disease, and 
nothing more” (Sontag, 1978). This abridgment may indeed 
help to disengage the patient from the crippling effects of 
“giving in to the disease” (and in turn enable her to turn over 
her body and problem to a physician), but it also leaves aside 
the significance of the phenomenon itself, as well as its 
extended meaning in the lives and relations of human beings.  
What indeed is the reference in the expression “just a 
disease”, and what is the metaphorical import of the counsel 
to “not give in”?  In the case of cancer, even at the biological 
level, clinical descriptions have recourse to metaphors of 
“invasive” cancer cells, “feeding on” other cells.  How much 
more is metaphor required in cases that extend diagnosis and 
dis/ ease to depression, grief, withdrawal, and anxiety?  That 
use may involve abuse does not lessen the need for metaphor 
in understanding the complexities of human experience. 
 
   Reference to death in literature is sometimes ambiguous 
and abstract, sometimes particular and visceral.  James 
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Joyce’s story “The Dead” opens onto a festive affair of the 
Misses Morkan’s annual dance, but also onto events and 
images of memory and time such that the shadow of death 
fully comprehends the living gathered there.  Metaphors of 
love and death contend in Joyce’s portrait of Ireland as a 
country of the dead, in which memories seem more alive 
than anything in its present existence; a nation and culture in 
which the dead exert leverage over the living. This story in 
the Dubliners carries a vague but insistent cultural finality, 
only less visceral than a familiar final image in Poe’s 
Masque of the Red Death, in which, in the festive ballroom 
of a thousand revelers, “…Death holds illimitable dominion 
over all” (1924, p. 186).  In such literary works, as in life, 
death makes its presence felt in the haunting of memory and 
culture as well as the ravages of epidemic and disease.  
There is no argument in either for a definitive cast of the 
human condition, only a reminder of our terms of 
engagement. 
 
   In very rare cases, we have documents of poetic voices of 
the dying, speaking about their own death in terms that draw 
each reader into the orbit of that life and death.  Ted 
Rosenthal died at the age of 34 of leukemia in 1972. The 
following are a few lines from his poem “How Could I Not 
Be Among You”:  
 
…I live as a man who knows death: 
It is not aimed at anyone 
But it will come your way 
The wind sweeps over everyone 
…You will feel so all alone, abandoned, 
And you will cry, “No, it cannot be so!” 
But nothing will avail you. 
It’s a circle in the round.  
No wings, backstage, leading act. 
A center stage for all of us. 
(1973, p.66) 
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   There is no room here to detail the crystallized pain that 
expresses the essence of Rosenthal’s experience of dying.  It 
is a testimony we may or may not trust, but it opens 
sensibility to an acute awareness of a common fate.  
Tolstoy’s familiar story, The Death of Ivan Illich, similarly 
draws us into the interstices of a mind and spirit caught up in 
the painful and eroding detail and gradual realization of 
death, trying to discover cognitive and emotional strategies 
of accommodation that only make matters worse. 
 
 … all the while here is death!  Can it really be 
death?" Again terror seized him…he tried to drive 
this morbid thought away and to replace it by 
healthy thoughts. But death, and not the thought 
only but the reality itself, seemed to come and 
confront him.…  He tried to get back into the 
former current of thoughts that had once screened 
the thought of death from him.  But strange to say, 
all that had formerly shut off, hidden, and destroyed 
his consciousness of death, no longer had that 
effect.  Ivan Ilych now spent most of his time in 
attempting to re-establish that old current.  
(1886)  
 
   In Tolstoy’s description, the “current of life,” that 
conscious if vague awareness that sustains Ivan’s sense of 
identity and wellness, is disrupted by the relentless 
foreboding of death.  Ordinarily the consciousness of life is 
automatic and simply accompanies us in our routine 
activities; life in its essential phenomenological duality with 
death, is not something we think about.  The pain that began 
for Ivan with a bump against the knob of a door, gradually 
becomes an awareness of death that tears away the 
thoughtless comfort of the current of life, so that death—the 
thought, the reality—pervades consciousness and finally 
 19 
nothing will help to reconnect him to the ease of that 
sustaining impulse. 
 
                                  V 
 
    Despite, or perhaps because of the obvious characteristics 
of the certainty and finality of death, there is an endless 
discussion of their implications at various levels of analysis.  
Hamlet’s parting words “The rest is silence” is understood as 
a remark not only about an individual’s life, but about death 
itself.  The familiar quip that the only things certain in this 
life are death and taxes, serves to align the unwanted, 
inevitable, and invasive intrusions of god and government in 
our lives.  Particularly interesting is the metaphorical 
reminder that death is the exacting tax levied on life. If death 
is inevitable and mortality is given as a condition of life, then 
it would seem natural as well as reasonable simply to accept 
it, to integrate this fact into the story of our lives in such a 
way that there is unanimity to life and death. Major theories 
of culture and human development suggest, on the contrary, 
that the whole history of human activity is to be understood 
as a reaction against the finality and certainty of death.  This 
suggests further that natural and rational responses to death 
may be at odds.  Natural life is simply at one with living and 
dying; but life and death which form a unity at an organic 
level in lower forms of animal life become separated into 
conflicting opposites at the human level.  
  
   In philosophical psychology as well as the philosophy of 
history, theorists have argued that the response of human 
beings to mortality defines the very structure of 
consciousness and the purposive activity of culture.  Freud’s 
familiar claim that the goal of all life is death—that the 
ultimate logic of biological homeostasis in human 
consciousness is embodied in a death instinct (Thanatos)—
has a parallel construction in Hegelian dialectics.  In Hegel’s 
account, man is a unique species which has a history—an 
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animal whose essence is a function of dialectical 
development in time.  At a biological level organisms have 
no history because living and dying are one; the defining 
activity of human culture can be understood in contrast as 
life against death, as attempts to contest death. In separating 
the natural unity of life and death, cultural history becomes a 
response to the conceived alienation of death.  
 
   Comportment toward death, whether individual or cultural, 
must still contend with the organic fact of mortality, of 
course. But the fact embodies a question mark: what is to be 
made of the fact?  Hegel, in The Science of Logic, cryptically 
remarks that the nature of finite things as such is to have the 
seed of passing away as their essential being, that the hour of 
their birth is the hour of their death.  Dylan Thomas gives a 
lyrical expression to this very experience in Fern Hill, which 
we cited at the beginning of this essay—that even while I am 
young and easy in the mercy of his means Time holds me, 
green and dying.  The same equation of life and death is 
expressed in the familiar metaphor that Time is the fire in 
which we burn. The bifurcation of life and death sets the 
relation as one of conflict, and taxes the living with 
resistance and opposition.  It was this opposition and 
conflict, of course, that was the presenting problem of Stoic 
and Epicurean strategies of resolution; but a simpler 
alternative is to accept the natural unity of life and death 
reconciled to species life. 
 
   The essential role that death plays in the development of 
culture reflects the peculiar nature of the human creature.  
Miguel Unamuno has suggested that a concern for the dead 
sets man apart from all other animals; that we go to such 
lengths to protect and store up the dead from an elemental 
dread of annihilation.  The conception of death as alien is 
arguably a factor in accounting for the activity of culture as a 
flight from death in the studied construction of a stable 
environment and permanent community, which in turn make 
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possible an enduring memory: a creative cultural frame of 
history and immortality.  If the essence of human being is 
discovered in desire no less than reason, then, once again, an 
understanding of death in human life must reach the deeper 
soundings of art and literature. 
 
   The literature of death comprehends several genres in 
resonance with spiritual life and religious ritual.  Along with 
tragic and elegiac literature, which focus on death and the 
dead, there are celebrations of death in the ordinary mass, 
and the requiem, in the Kaddish, at wakes, and memorials of 
every description.  World literature traces a broad spectrum 
of the shadow culture of human imagination from classical 
accounts, in Homer’s epic of mass slaughter and the burning 
of Ilium and the journey of Odysseus to Hades, (where he 
discovers that one can speak only individually with the 
dead), to the public orations of death in Perikles’ 
commemoration of the Peloponnesian war dead.  Poetic 
expression varies from elegy to dirge; Tennyson’s poignant 
lament for his friend in the long poem In Memoriam, that 
“Death has made his darkness beautiful with thee” (1941, 
p.356) is characteristic of mourning in response to grief. The 
persistence unto death of Antigone’s determination to bury 
her brother against the prohibition of the state, speaks as well 
to the rule of war in every age to retrieve the dead. The 
Walkuries riding out to claim the heroic dead fallen on the 
field of battle is a familiar figure in art that testifies to the 
ubiquitous presence of death that accompanies human 
aspiration. 
 
   What does this extension of inquiry into the fictive 
contexts and expressions of death contribute to the 
substantive and procedural insights of traditional 
philosophy? Most importantly, the idea that the phenomenon 
of death is a pervasive feature embodied in every aspect of 
human understanding and concern, and that it is a mistake to 
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insist on a reductive analysis that would fix the boundaries of 
meaning to an objective and literal reference. 
 
   Death can indeed be many things—and by this I mean that 
it means many things to human beings individually and 
collectively.  Does it stalk the lonely, and come like a thief in 
the night? Sometimes; but Emily Dickenson’s expression 
“Because I could not stop for death, he kindly stopped for 
me…” (1960, p. 350) suggests a different aspect of death, 
courteous in its manner of address.  John Keats, who lived 
not long enough, and who admitted at times to be half in love 
with easeful death, wrote of a longing ‘to cease upon the 
midnight with no pain’ (l993, p. 106).   
 
   The seductiveness of death is a familiar theme, quite apart 
from Freud’s assimilation of Thanatos into the dynamic of 
human life. Toward the end of Sylvia Plath’s 
autobiographical novel, a passage begins: “I knew just how I 
would do it”; (1996) in retrospect of Plath’s own suicide, this 
situation takes on an acute pain of disclosure about the 
appeal of ending one’s life, shutting out the pain,  the worry, 
expectations, demands, anxiety, the whole bother of world 
and other.  In this simple narrative, the character waits until 
she is alone in the house, puts on a nice dress, writes a note 
that she is going out for a while, climbs on a chair to get her 
mother’s pills hidden in a box high in the closet, puts on a 
raincoat, goes down into the cellar and into a crawlspace 
under the porch, pulls a log in after to conceal her presence. 
This is how it ends: 
 
 Cobwebs touched my face with the softness 
of moths.  Wrapping my black coat round me like 
my own sweet shadow, I unscrewed the bottle of 
pills and started taking them swiftly, between gulps 
of water, one by one by one. 
At first nothing happened, but as I approached the 
bottom of the bottle, red and blue lights began to 
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flash before my eyes.  The bottle slid from my 
fingers and I lay down.  The silence drew off, 
baring the pebbles and shells and all the tatty 
wreckage of my life.  Then, at the rim of vision, it 
gathered itself, and in one sweeping tide, rushed me 
to sleep. 
(Plath, 1996) 
 
   However alien death may seem, our recognition of its 
presence in the life of this young woman makes clear its 
intimate relation to ordinary consciousness.  If we are to 
understand the reach of its shadow into the light of our 
continuance, we must come to see death through the eyes of 
a poet writing about her own life, and more generally 
through the words of poets who search out the sounds of its 
variegated expression in life and literature. 
 
   The task of philosophy is not to solve the riddle of death, 
or put an end to the question of what death is by a definitive 
answer to its own question.  Rather, the task before us, here 
as elsewhere, is to open up the range of intelligible discourse 
to the full meaning of its expression.  
  
   Marlowe’s familiar soliloquy on life and death in Conrad’s 
The Heart of Darkness, is perhaps where we can leave off 
(as well as take up) the matter.   Marlowe refers to his own 
near death on a remote jungle river in the heart of the Dark 
Continent that had stripped away the conceits of civilized 
European culture. Remembering the gnawing presence in his 
mind, he later reflects on the experience: 
 
Droll thing life is—that mysterious arrangement of 
merciless logic for a futile purpose.  The most you 
can hope from it is some knowledge of yourself—
that comes too late—a crop of unextinguishable 
regrets.  I have wrestled with death.  It is the most 
unexciting contest you can imagine.  It takes place 
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in an impalpable grayness, with nothing underfoot, 
with nothing around, without spectators, without 
clamor, without glory, without the great desire of 
victory, without the great fear of defeat, in a sickly 
atmosphere of tepid scepticism, without much 
belief in your own right, and still less in that of 
your adversary.  If such is the form of ultimate 
wisdom, then life is a greater riddle than some of us 
think it to be.  I was within a hair’s breadth of the 
last opportunity for pronouncement, and I found 
with humiliation that probably I would have 
nothing to say. 
(1971) 
 
   Perhaps the most important philosophical insight, coming 
full circle, is to acknowledge the obvious: the riddle of life 
and death remains after everything else has been said.  
Shakespeare’s conclusive remark in Hamlet that the rest is 
silence is not the last word, even for him.  In passage after 
passage in the corpus of his work he investigates the depth of 
the question and experience of death, and offers a fictive 
world of imaginative space for investigation.  Whether man 
is a poor player that frets and struts his hour upon the stage 
and then is heard no more, or whether at the end of our 
revels we are spirits and are melted into air; whether we are 
such stuff as dreams are made of and like the fabric of the 
vision before us we dissolve and leave not a rack behind, 
literature embodies a rich store of metaphor in the narratives 
of life unto death that invites philosophical interest and 
analysis. 
 
   Wittgenstein’s limiting rule in the Tractatus for rational 
discourse may be appropriate to review, in closing. His 
dictum that “of what we cannot speak, we must remain 
silent” (1974, #7) has appealed strongly to the literal biases 
of empirical science.  But the rule itself refers only to the 
objective domain of factive discourse, or more narrowly to 
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propositional claims appropriate to science. As 
Wittgenstein’s later work makes clear, a good deal remains 
to be said about the silence itself, and all that remains in the 
fullness of meaning within the life world of experience.  
 
   If indeed, the rest is silence, it is, for purposes of 
philosophical inquiry, a very full and meaningful silence, 
and we should continue to pursue the ghost threads of insight 
into death wherever they lead.   
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